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RECENT DECISIONS
"fair play and substantial justice. ' 26 A unique feature of Wis. Stat.
Ch. 26227 is designed to keep the Statute's application within the limits
of fair play and "substantial justice." If a state court finds on the
motion of any party that as a matter of "substantial justice" the pend-
ing action though grounded on a sufficient basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction ought to be tried in another forum outside Wis-
consin, it may enter an order to stay further proceedings in this State.
A moving party must stipulate his consent to suit in the alternate
forum and waive his right to rely on statutes of limitations which may
have run in such other forum. A hearing is had on such motion, and
separate findings made by the court on each issue in a single order
which is appealable. This is a great improvement over the injunctive
and forum non conveniens proceedings where appeal could only be
taken after entry of judgment. Wis. Stat. Ch. 262 also lays down some
general considerations to guide the courts in using their discretion to
grant or deny the motion, such as amenability to personal jurisdiction
in Wisconsin and in any alternative forum of the parties; convenience
of parties and witnesses; and a catch-all section: "Any other factors
having substantial bearing upon the selection of a convenient, reason-
able, and fair place of trial." As similar general considerations are
found in the change of venue statutes, Wis. Stat. §261.04 and 28
U.S.C. §1404(a), and in the area of forum non conveniens, it is to
be expected that the particular objective factors considered important
in these areas will also apply in granting or denying the motion under
the Wisconsin statute. EDWARD R. KAISER
Sales-Implied Warranty and Sales of Chicken Sandwich-Plain-
tiff ordered, paid for and consumed a sliced chicken sandwich at de-
fendant's restaurant. The sandwich consisted of a layer of two or
three pieces of thinly sliced white chicken meat and a layer of lettuce,
between two slices of bread. After eating the sandwich plaintiff felt
a sharp pain in his throat and upon investigation it was discovered
that embedded in the lettuce and bread was a sharp fragment of
chicken bone about one and one-half inches long and about one-eighth
of an inch in diameter at its thickest point.
2G International Shoe Co. supra note 28 at 320. ". . . It is evident that these opera-
tions establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it
reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which ap-
pellant has incurred there . . ." While some of the provisions go beyond the
facts of that case, i.e., permit exercise of jurisdiction with less than the number
or degree of contacts found there, they may be readily sustained in view of
subsequent supreme court decisions, such as Travelers Health Association v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) and McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (which indicate a continuing trend toward liberality).
27 Wis. Stat. §262.19 (1) (1959).
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The action was based upon the alternative theories of breach of
implied warranty arising under Wis. Stat. 121.151 and negligence. The
case is one of first impression and therefore no Wisconsin cases in-
fluenced its result. The trial court upheld the defendant's demurrer,
basing its decision upon the "natural to the basic object" test.2 This
principle may be stated as follows: a harmful substance present in
food which is natural to it cannot be a legal defect and is therefore
not actionable. Since a chicken bone is natural to a chicken sandwich,
the trial court decided that defendant's demurrer should be sustained.
However the Wisconsin Supreme Court held for the plaintiff on the
ground that the proper test should be what is "reasonably expected"
by the consumer to be in the food as served. 3 Since a chicken bone
is not reasonably expected to be in a chicken sandwich, the trial court's
demurrer was reversed and the case sent back for trial. The court
ruled that the "natural to the basic object" test was weak in that
because a substance is natural to a product in one stage of preparation
does not mean that it will be reasonably anticipated by the average
consumer in the final product served. Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10
Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W. 2d 64, 69 (1960).
The "natural to the basic object" test seems to have originated in
Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.4 In this case plaintiff was injured by a
chicken bone in a chicken potpie. On demurrer the court held the
defendant was not liable under an implied warranty or negligence
theory because a chicken bone was natural to the chicken potpie and
therefore not a foreign substance, and it was common knowledge
chicken pies occasionally contain chicken bones, and therefore their
presence ought to be anticipated and guarded against by the average
consumer. Note that the rule in this case is not based solely on the
"naturalness" principle but that the court also considered whether
such bones could be anticipated and guarded against, a tenet bearing
relation to the "reasonable expectation" test adopted in the principal
case. Other cases relied on by the appellee quote the Mix case or cite
it as controllng.5 The Illinois Court, in Goodwin v. Country Club of
1 Wis. Stat. 121.15: Implied Warranties of Quality and Fitness. Subject to
the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, there is no implied
warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for any particular purpose of
goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows: (1)
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose.
2 Brief for Appellant, p. 107, Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103
N.W. 2d 64 (1960).
3 Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W. 2d 64, 69 (1960).
4 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P. 2d 144 (1936).
-5 Silva v. F. W. "Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P. 2d 76 (1938) ; Lamb
v. Hill, 112 Cal. App. 2d 41, 245 P. 2d 316 (1952).
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Peoria,6 stated that those eating the meat of animals, fish or fowl should
do so with the knowledge that such food may contain pieces of bone.
An analysis of these and other cases,7 cited in the Betehia case, lead
one to the conclusion that while the "naturalness" principle is given
great weight, the question of anticipation enters into each case and
is often used as supporting argument. As pointed out by Dickinson,
after discussing the Mix,s SilvaP and Brown cases, 0
These cases already cited in the preceding section have adopted
the consumer expectation approach as a supporting rationale,
possibly on the assumption that anything that is natural to the
product is in fact anticipated by the consumer."
The appellant argued that though this bone was natural, its presence
in the food could not be reasonably anticipated by the consumer and
the court adopted this position.' 2
In Wood v. Waldorf System,'3 involving a chicken bone in
chicken soup, the court presented a concise statement of the "reason-
able expectation" test:
In our judgment the question is not whether the substance may
have been natural or proper at some time in the early stages of
preparation of this kind of soup, but whether the presence of
such substance, if it is harmful and makes the food unfit for
human consumption, is natural and ordinarily expected to be
in the final product which is impliedly represented as fit for
human consumption.14
The Rhode Island Court placed emphasis on the nature of the food
being served, its preparation and its final appearance. In the Betehia
case the court also stressed the appearance of the article as finally
served.'5
Wisconsin, in adopting the "reasonable expectation" test, has taken
the more logical position. Dickerson points out that those cases resting
on the principle of "naturalness," "in the sense that nothing that is an
inherent part of the raw product itself can be a legal defect," are of
6323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E. 2d 612 (1944).
7B3rown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941); Norris v. Pig'n
Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E. 2d 718 (1949) ; Shapiro
v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891, (S.D. Cal. 1955); Adams v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E. 2d 92 (1960).
s Supra note 4.
9 Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 5.
10 Brown v. Nebiker, supra note 7.
11 DicxERsoN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY AND THE FooD CONSUMER 186 (1st ed. 1951).
12 Supra note 3 ,at 67.
1379 R.I. 1, 83 A. 2d 90 (1951).
14 Id. at 93.
15 "There is a distinction between what a consumer expects to find in a fish stick
and a baked or fried fish, or in a chicken sandwich made from sliced white
meat and in roast chicken. The test should be what is reasonably expected
by the consumer in the food as served, not what be natural to the ingredients
of that food prior to preparation." Supra note 3, at 68-69.
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little value, and prefers the "reasonable expectation" test.16 The specific
facts in each of these cases are of great importance and the "reason-
able expectation" test allows the court to give special scrutiny to each
particular fact situation. For example, a court, in applying the "reason-
able expectation" test, could conclude that a chicken bone in a piece
of fried chicken should be expected, but a bone in a sliced chicken
sandwich should not be expected. But the court could not reach the
same result applying the "natural to the basic object" test because
the court is placed in a "straight-jacket" of its own making and
would have to reach the same result whether the article involved was
fried chicken or a sliced chicken sandwich, chicken bone being natural
to either article.
What effect will the "naturalness" theory have on future Wis-
consin law? It seems that "naturalness" is now important only in
determining whether the consumer may reasonably expect to find a
bone in the particular preparation he is eating.1 7 Therefore, while
some states have adopted the "natural to the basic object" test and
used the expectation idea in support of it, Wisconsin has adopted the
"reasonable expectation" test and uses the question of naturalness to
help determine what is reasonably expected.
The Court said that what is reasonably expected by the consumer
is a jury question in most cases.' Of the nine cases cited in the prin-
cipal case as adopting the "natural to the basic object" test,19 only one
of these was decided by a jury and the appellate court overruled this
finding.20 But of the eight cases21 putting forth the "reasonable ex-
pectation" idea five of these" were decided by juries when first tried.
16 Supra note 11, at 185.
17 Supra note 3, at 328, 103 N.W. 2d 64, 67.
18 Id. at 69.
19 Mix v. Ignersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P. 2d 144 (1936) ; Silva v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P. 2d 76 (1938); Brown v. Nebiker,
229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) ; Goodwin v. Country Club of Peoria, 323
Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E. 2d 612 (1944); Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop,
Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E. 2d 718 (1949) ; Lamb v. Hill, 112 Cal. App. 2d.
41, 245 P. 2d 316 (1952) ; Davison-Paxon Co. v Archer, 91 Ga. App 131, 85
S.E. 2d 182 (1954) ; Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891, (S.D.
Cal. 1955) ; Adams v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.
2d 92 (1960).
20 Davison-Paxon Co. v. Archer, 91 Ga. App. 131, 85 S.E. 2d 182 (1954).
21 Roseberry v. Wachter, 33 Del. 253, 138 Atl. 273 (1925) ; Gimenez v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934) ; O'Hare v.
Peterson, 174 Misc. 481, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 487 (1940); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh
Mercantile Co. 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. 2d 913 (1942) ; Paolinelli v. Dainty Foods
Mfg., Inc., 322 Ill. App. 586, 54 N.E. 2d 759 (1944); Lore v. De Simone Bros.,
12 Misc. 2d 174, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (1958) ; Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md.
105, 156 A. 2d 442 (1959) ; Wood v. Waldorf System, 79 R.I. 1, 83 A. 2d 90
(1951).
22 Roseberry v. Wachter, supra note 21; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile
Co., supra note 21; Paolonelli v. Dainty Foods Mfg. Inc., supra note 21;
Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., supra note 21; Wood v. Waldorf System, supra
note 21.
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Since what is to be reasonably expected by a consumer seems more
a question of fact than of law, the approach of the Wisconsin Court
seems sound.
Of the cases cited in favor of the "natural to the basic object"
test 2 3 all of which deny liability, applying the "reasonable expectation"
test all would reach the same result, with one exception.24 In that case,
involving a turkey bone imbedded in the dressing of a special plate
of roast turkey, perhaps a jury might find that one would not reason-
ably expect a turkey bone in turkey dressing. But it seems the other
cases would reach the same result, even applying the "reasonable
expectation" test, because they involve such preparations as a chicken
bone in a chicken potpie,2 a particle of bone in a barbecued pork
sandwich,26 a turkey bone in creamed turkey,27 and other similar fact
situations. Of the eight "reasonable expectation" cases cited in the
principal case, s at least five might have reached a different result by
applying the "naturalness" principle because the cases involved situ-
ations where the harmful object was natural to the product served
to the consumer.
29
The court did not stress the negligence aspect of the Betehia case.
It seems it felt that both theories of action, implied warranty and
negligence, were controlled by the same principles of law. While not
an insurer, the court said the restaurant owner has the duty of ordi-
nary care to remove harmful bones which the consumer would not
ordinarily anticipate.2 0 It appears that the principal case would have
reached the same result if *tried under the proposed Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Under the U.C.C., 2-715(2) (b), consequential dam-
ages may be awarded for injury to person or property proximately
resuting from any breach of warranty. The comment to this section
explains that where the goods are used without such an inspection
as would have discovered the defect, the question of "proximate"
cause turns on whether it was reasonable for a buyer to use the goods
without such inspection. Relating this to the principal case, if it was
reasonable for a consumer to eat a particular preparation without
expecting to find any bones in it, the bones were the "proximate"
cause of the injury and thus recoverable as consequential damages
under the Uniform Commercial Code. The Betehia case involved an-
23 Cases cited supra note 19.
24 Silva v. F. W. Woolworth, supra note 5.
25 Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., supra note 19.
26 Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., supra note 19.
27Goodvin v. Country Club of Peoria, supra note 19.
2s Cases cited supra note 21.
29 Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., supra note 19; Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
supra note 19; Brown v. Nebiker, supra note 19; Lamb v. Hill, supra note 19;
Davison-Paxon Co. v. Archer, supra note 19.
30 Supra note 3, at 69.
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other aspect of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code, namely
whether the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant was a
service or a sale, to which an implied warranty could attach. Both
the proposed Uniform Commercial Code and the Wisconsin Court,31
in the principal case state that such transaction is a sale.
A factor not mentioned in the principal case but which has been
considered in warranty decisions is the matter of public policy, which
requires that a person serving food to the public be held to a high
standard of care because of the great harm that can be caused if such
standards are not imposed. This thought seems to be an underlying
principle with reference to consumer protection in the service of food.
WILLIAM E. MCCARTY
31 Supra note 3, at 66.
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